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NOTES
"RAINBOW CITY"-THE NEED FOR FEDERAL CONTROL
IN THE SALE OF UNDEVELOPED LAND
I. Introduction
For many years, the interstate sale of undeveloped land has caused misery
for many people. Such land has often been bought by elderly persons seeking to
build homes for retirement.' Others have purchased subdivided lots with the intention of obtaining extravagant returns.2 In actuality, much of this land has
been situated in "swamps, flood control areas, deserts, mountains, remote valleys,
and-in some cases-jungle lava beds outside the continental U.S. .

. ."I

The

adaptability of the land for retirement residence and its potential for investment
returns were often nonexistent. People therefore found themselves retiring
without land upon which to build. Those who bought the land for investment
squandered their money without a chance of obtaining a return.
Although the states addressed themselves to the problem of remedying these
abuses, their attempts were futile. Federal solutions were equally inept. This
Note will examine the inadequacies of these state and federal attempts to remedy
the situation, and it will put forward a plan which can and must be followed in
order to adequately protect the American public.
II. State Statutory Controls
An examination of existing state statutes reveals that state laws concerning
the sale of land break down into three main categories. The first category contains some of the oldest statutes in the spectrum and may be designated as the
"false" or "fraudulent advertising" category.4 Certain classes of "consumer protection" statutes comprise the second category.5 "Land registration" or "dis1 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Frauds and MisrepresentationsAffecting the Elderly
of the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1964
Hearings].
2 Hearings on S. 2672 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Hearings).
3 114 CONG. REc. 15271 (1968).
4 False Advertising: Alabama: ALA. CODE ch. 45 § 211 (1959); Arkansas: Aax. STAT.
ANN. § 41-1961 (Cu . Supp. 1969); Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. § 157.21a (Cure. Supp. 1971);
Kentucky: Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 434 § 434.270 (1969); Louisiana: LA. Rav. STAT. tit. 51,
§ 411 (1965); Mississippi: Miss. CODE ANN. § 2003.5 (Cu.
Supp. 1968); Nevada: NEV.
REv. STAT. ch. 207, § 207.170 (1967); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-12-01 (Supp.
1969); South Dakota: S.D. CODE ch. 22-41, § 22-41-10 (1967); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. ch.
4, § 76-4-1 (1953); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. ch. 4, § 59.1-44 (1968 Replacement Volume);
Wyoming: Wyo. STAT. ANN. ch. 3, § 6-35 (1957).
Fraudulent advertising: District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. ch. 14, § 22-1411
(1967); Michigan: MicH. CoMP. LAws § 445.801 (1967); Mississippi: Miss. CODE ANN. §
2003.5 (Cum. Supp. 1968); New Jersey: N.J. Rav. STAT. § 56:8-1 (Cur. Supp. 1970-1971);
Ohio: OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.33 (Supp. 1970); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 391910 (Cum. Supp. 1970); Texas: TEx. CODE ANN. § 17.12 (Cu . Supp. 1970-1971).
5 Arizona: ARiz. Rzv. STAT. ANN. ch. 10, §§ 44-1521 to 44-1534 (1967); Colorado:
COLO. R sv. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-5-1 to 55-5-13 (Permanent Cur. Supp. 1969); Delaware:
DEL. CODS ANN. §§ 2511-27 (Cure. Supp. 1968); Iowa: IowA CODE ANN. § 713.24 (Cu.
Supp. 1970); Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, §§ 19-27 (1969 Replacement Volume);
Massachusetts: MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 93A, §§ 1-10 (Cu . Supp. 1969); Pennsylvania: PA.
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closure" statutes make up the third category. 6
State "false advertising" statutes are generally aimed at preventing misleading advertising.' They ordinarily do this by prohibiting intentional deception.' Violations of the act are criminal offenses and fines are generally imposed
on the violators.' 'This method prevents deception through deterrence only--not
via active before-the-fact prevention.
"Consumer protection" statutes in a number of states" present a more
modern approach to the elimination of fraudulent practices in the interstate sale
of subdivided land."- The "consumer protection" statute generally addresses
itself to the problem of intentional deception practiced upon the recipient."
"Merchandise" is defined to include real estate," and the attorney general of the
state is charged both with enforcement 4 and with recommending legislation to
keep the law abreast of schemes devised by promoters.' Enforcement of the
statute is generally accomplished by means of injunctions," cease and desist
agreements,' and fines and/or imprisonment for violations of injunctions.' s
§§ 201-1 to 201-9 (Cum.Supp. 1970); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 13.1, §§ 6-13.1-1 to 6-13.1-11 (1969); Texas: Tsx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. ch. 10, art.
5069-10.01 to 10.08 (1971); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. ch. 63, §§ 2451-62 (Cum.Supp.
STAT. ANN. ch. 4,

1970); Washington: WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 19.86.010 to 19.86.920 (Supp. 1970).
6 Alaska: ALASKA STAT. ch. 55, §§ 04. to 46. (Cum.Supp. 1969); Connecticut: CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-329a to 20-329m (Cum.Supp. 1970-1971); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 478.011 to 478.33 (Cum. Supp. 1970-1971); Hawaii: HAwAII Rxv. LAws ch. 484, §§
484-1 to 484-22 (1968); Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. §§ 371-89 (Cum.Supp. 1971); Kansas:
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3301 to 58-3323 (Cum.Supp. 1970); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN.
ch. 83, §§ 83.01 to 83.19 (1968); Montana: MONT. REV. CODES ANN. ch. 21, §§ 67-2101 to
67-2136 (2d Replacement Volume 1970); New Hampshire: N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 356-A: 1
to 356-A:22 (Supp. 1970); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-3-1 to 70-3-9 (Supp. 1969);
Ohio: OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.33-331 (Supp. 1970); South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 57-551 to 57-571 (Cum.Supp. 1970); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-1602 to 481632 (Cum.Supp. 1970); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE ANN. art. 2, §§ 32-2-1 to 32-2-3
(1966).
7 See note 4 supra. See also Appendix infra.
8 Id.
9 E.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. § 41-1964 (Cum.Supp. 1969) provides:
Any person, firm, corporation, group, association or the agent or servant of any
other firm, corporation, group or association, violating any provision of this section
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a
fine of not less than one hundred dollars [$100] nor more than one thousand dollars
[$1,000] or be imprisoned in the county jail not more than sixty [60] days, or by~both
such fine and imprisonment; and each sale, advertisement or representation in contravention of the provisions of this section shall be deemed a distinct offense and shall
subject the offender to such punishment. [Acts 1967, No. 153, § 4, p. 325.]
10 See note 5 supra.
11 E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 24- (1969 Replacement Volume). These statutes take a
more meaningful approach to the problem of adjusting law to novel fraudulent schemes. The
statute says:
(a) The Attorney General shall be authorized from time to time to recommend
to the Governor and the General Assembly legislation to protect the public from
fraudulent promoters and the schemes .which they propose.
12 See note 5 supra. See also Appendix infra.
13 E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 20 (1969 Replacement Volume) provides that
"(b) The term 'merchandise' means any objects, wares, goods, commodities, intangibles, or real
estate."
14 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 22 (1969 Replacement Volume). See also note 5
-supraand Appendix infra.
15 See note 11 supra.
16 See, e.g., MD.ANN. CODE art. 83, § 22 (1969 Replacement Volume). See also note 5
supra and Appendix infra.
17 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 22A (1969 Replacement Volume).
18 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 22 (1969 Replacement Volume). See also note 5
and Appendix infra.
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Although there are several types of "land registration" statutes, 9 the most
modem type dealing with interstate land sales practices is: the Uniforr Land
Sales Practices Act." Though administered! by different state agencies, 21 the
Uniform Act mandates registration of subdivisions, 2' registration of a public offering statement,23 and full and fair disclosure.2 4 Enforcement is effectuated by
means of injunctions, 25 investigations, 6 cease and desist orders, 7 fines and imprisonment, 8 and civil remedies.- The Uniform Act, however, still suffers .from
the basic inability of state jurisdiction to reach the foreign seller of. foreign land
who contacts the state citizen by telephone or through the mails.
Although state statutes provide means to impede inequitable practices in the
interstate sale of subdivided land, they are hampered either in their after-thefact application," the necessity of proving intent,"' or the state's basic'lack of
jurisdiction. 2 More than state' control-is generally needed in order to rectify the
potential abuses in the sale of undeveloped land.
III. Federal Controls
Several times during the 1966 Congressional hearings on proposed interstate
land sales legislation, it was suggested that effective'state laws, supplemented by the
federal postal laws, would be adequate to prevent fraud in interstate land sales. 3
An examination of the postal "False Representations: Lotteries" statute, however,
is sufficient to negate any suggestion that the postal law could supplement even
19 See note 6 supra.

40 See, e.g., ALAsA STAT. ch. 55, §§ 04. to 46. (Cum. Supp. 1969).
21
infra.
22 ' See-Appendix
See ALAsxA STAT.
ch. 55, §§ 04. to 46. (Cum. Supp. '1969); FLA.

478.011 to 478.33 (Cum. Supp. 1970-1971);
(1968);

KAN. STAT. ANN.

IuREv.

STAT. ANN. §§
LAws ch. 484, §§ 484-1 to 484-22

§§ 58-3301 to 58-3323 (Cum. Supp. 1970);

57-551 to 57-571 (Cum. Supp. 1970).
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

HAI

S.C. CODZ ANN. §§

See, e.g., ALAsExA STAT. ch. 55, § 34.55.012. (Cum. Supp. 1969).
Id.
Id. § 34.55.020.
Id.
Id. § 34.55.024.
Id. § 34.55.028.
The Alaska statute, for example, provides that:

(b) In addition to any other remedies, the purchaser, under (a) -of this section,
may recover the consideration paid for the lot, parcel, unit or interest in subdivided

land together with interest at the rate of six per'cent a year from the date of paynent, property, taxes -paid; costs, and reasonable attorney' fees less the amount of
income received from the subdivided land upon tender of appropriate instruments of
reconveyance. If the purchaser no longer owns the lot,' parcel, unit or interest in
subdivided land, he may recover the amount that would be recoverable upon a tender
of a reconveyance less the value of the land when disposed of and less interest at the
rate of six per cent a year on that amount from the date of disposition. Id. §
34.55.030.
30 See note 4 supra.
31 See note 5 supra and Appendix infra.

32 1966 Hearings at 113. Herbert E. Wenig,' Assistant Attorney General for the State of
California, testified that:
G
California 'and her sister States today stand helpless at their borders against the
out-of-State mail-order- defrauder, law evader, and invader. When an out-of-State
mail-order promoter is selling lots in a Staie, without complying with State law; the
most that a State can do is obtain an injunction decree in its 'own courts ....
If an injunction is obtained bUt the promoter chooses to ignoie it. there is nothing a
33

State can do.
1966 Hearings at 189.
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the more effective state laws. 4 For example, the opening language of the statute
states that it applies only "Upon evidence satisfactory to the Postmaster General
that any person is engaged in conducting a scheme or device for obtaining money
or property through the mail by means of false representations... ,,ss (Emphasis
added.) Although the statute employs the term "false representations" 6 instead
of "fraudulent,"3 no affirmative duty to disclose materialfacts is present. Rather,
one must only avoid misrepresenting those facts which he discloses.
Criticism was leveled at this flaw in the statute in 1966 by Senator Mondale 8
and still seems applicable today. During the 1966 hearings, many examples were
presented in which the lack of disclosure of material facts, rather than the misrepresentation of disclosed facts, caused the actual harm. 9 It is this lack of
affirmative duty to disclose which title XIV (the Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act) of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 (discussed
below) seeks to alleviate.4"
Another suggestion made at the 1966 hearings urged that the Federal Trade
Commission acts, in conjunction with the postal regulations, supply adequate
safeguards when used to supplement state protective statutes.4 1 The first section of
the Federal Trade Commission acts which would have applicable value states:
"Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce, are declared unlawful."4 Enforcement of the act is
accomplished through the use of cease and desist orders43 and a civil penalty of
up to $5,000 per violation.4 4 This is clearly after-the-fact punishment, however,
rather than action calculated to protect the investor before he is financially

injured.
The second FTC section which may be used in dealing with advertisements
states: "It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation to
34 39 U.S.C. § 4005 (Supp. V, 1970), amending 39 U.S.C. § 4005 (1964).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 39 U.S.C. § 4005 (1964), as amended, 39 U.S.C. § 4005 (Supp. V, 1970).
38 1966 Hearings at 68. Senator Mondale asked: "What about the problem of misinformation, which is not fraudulent, what about the problem of not providing information about the
detrimental aspects, the basic information which the consumer must have to make a rational
choice?"
39 Id. at 71. An excerpt from promotional literature referring to Golden Palm Acres in
Florida is as follows:
They ("smart investors") know that Florida is the fastest-growing major state
in the nation with hundreds of thousands of new residents pouring in each year.
They know that choice land MUST rise in value because these people cause an insatiable demand for homes, schools, shopping centers, etc .....
.. They know that
Dade County's population is expected to Double by 1985 ....
Golden Palm Acres offers you Now the tremendous opportunity to be an investor in this phenomenal area . . . . You receive free warranty deed which is title
insurable plus a full 50% of all oil, gas, and mineral rights. Id. at 40.
In reality, Golden Palm Acres was subject to an easement in a flood control district so
that the land could be flooded at any time.
Isolating the problem, Senitor Mondale remarked "It is not fraud. It might be some
extreme that in a long criminal trial you could prove that they had a duty to mention it, but
that is a very tough, long hard case. They just failed to tell anybody that it is a very nice
location for a home, it just floods from time to time." Id. at 71.
40 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1705, 1706(d), 1707, 1709 (Supp. V, 1970).
41 1966 Hearings at 189.
42 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964), 52 Stat. 114 (1938), amending, 38 Stat. 719 (1914).
43 Id. § 45(b).
44 Id. § 45(1).
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disseminate, or cause to be disseminated, any false advertisement.""5 Violation
of this section can give rise to the issuance of a temporary injunction pending
determination of a cease and desist order." The phrase "false advertisement" is
inadequate when dealing with undisclosed information since, although a set of
facts may give rise to a logical but erroneous inference, the information itself may
be merely speculative and the actual facts quite correct 4 7
State law alone or in conjunction with federal postal and/or Federal Trade
Commission regulations is inadequate to prepare the land purchaser for an
intelligent decision when facts material to such a decision are undisclosed. As was
noted above, punishment may be triggered when actual fraud is perpetrated,4
and misrepresentation may lead to an injunction, "9 but a clear mandate to disclose
those facts essential to an intelligent investment decision must be supplied by a
statute in the nature of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act."0 Even in
those states which have stringent subdivision land sales regulation,"1 the jurisdictional problem is insoluble without adequate federal control.5 2 Although the suggestion that unanimous approval of the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act,
together with effective government implementation of the postal and Federal
Trade Commission acts, appears to be a feasible alternative to title XIV, a
history of state inaction militates against the likelihood of such
unanimous ap54
proval." It is for this reason that title XIV was finally passed.
IV. Title XIV and the Securities Act of 1933
Title XIV (or the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act) is administered
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The title; however, is
patterned after the Securities Act of 1933. As enacted in 1968, the Act basically
provides that the seller of undeveloped land must inform his buyer of all facts
45 Id. § 52(a).
46 Id. § 53(a).
47 Sze 1966 Hearings at 68. See also note 39 supra for a good example of an extremely
speculative description and a blatant omission short of outright fraud.
48 Fraudulent advertising: Federal: 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 52 Stat. 114 t1938),
15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52, 53 (1964); District of Columbia: D.C. CoDE ENCYCL. ANN. ch. 14, §
22-1411 (1967); Michigan: MIcH. Comp. LAws J 445.801 (1967); Mississippi: Miss. CoDz
ANN. § 407.010 (Cum. Supp. 1970-1971); New Jersey: N.J. Rxv. STAT. § 56:8-1 (Cum.
Supp. 1970-1971); Ohio: OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2911.41 (Supp. 1970); Tennessee: TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-1910 (Cum. Supp. 1970); Texas: Tax. CODE ANN. § 17.12 -(Cum. Supp.
1970-1971).
Consumer Fraud: See note 5 supra.
Postal fraud: 39 U.S.C. § 4005 (1964), as amended, 39 U.S.C. § 4005 (Supp. V, 1970).
Land Fraud: exemplified in the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act. See note 22 supra.
49 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 53 (1964), 52 Stat. 114 (1938), amending, 38 Stat. 719 (1914).
50 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (Supp. V, 1970).
51 E.g., Alaska: ALASKA STAT. ch. 55, §§ 04. to 46. (Cum. Supp. 1969); Florida: FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 478.011 to 478.33 (Cum. Supp. 1970-1971); Hawaii: HAWAuI RIEv. LAws ch.
484, §§ 484-1 to 484-22 (1968); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3301 to 58-3323 (Cum.
Supp. 1970); South Carolina:S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 57-551 to 57-571 (Cum. Supp. 1970).
52 1966 Hearings at 113. See note 32 supra for a statement by Herbert E. Wenig, Assistant Attorney General for the State of California in 1966.
53 See 114 CONG. REc. 15271 (1968) for a statement by Senator Williams of New Jersey
concerning state inaction.
54 See H.R. REP. No. 1785, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1968). The report states that
"The purpose of full disclosure is to deter or prohibit the sale of land by use of the mails or
other channels of interstate commerce through misrepresentation of material facts relating to
the property."
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which would be material to the buyer in deciding whether or not to purchase the
land. Public registration reports must be filed in the ordinary case, and penalties
are imposed on the seller for failure to comply with the Act.
Because title XIV is patterned on the Securities Act of 1933, interpretation of the title will most likely follow that of the Securities Act. Interpretation of
title XIV along these lines will indeed provide maximum protection for the
investor in interstate land.
A look at thee principles of securities law which are most adaptable to the
interstate land sales area convinces one that the field of "investment contracts"
provides the most adequate precedent for interpreting an interstate land sales
statute. Although the phrase "investment contract" contained in the definition
of security,5" is defined in neither the federal nor state securities laws,5" the development of case law interpreting the term provides a basis upon which to
include within it many varied transactions. It was stated in the case of SEC v.
W.J. Howey Co.7 -that:
In other words, an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act
means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money
in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts
of the promoter or a third party ....5
In another Supreme Court case, S.E.C. v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corporation,59 it was stated that:
It is clear that an economic interest in this well-drilling undertaking was
what brought into being the instruments that defendants were selling and
gave to the instruments most of their value and all of their lure. The trading
in these documents had all the evils inherent in the securities transactions
which it was the aim of the Securities Act to end.60
It is this exact type of "economic interese' which has induced many persons to
buy worthless land.
There are basically two types of sales which cause problems in interstate
land promotions. First, there is land advertised as ideal for retirement purposes;"1
and second, there is land suggesting ideal investment potential.6 2 This distinction
must be retained when treating the development of the investment contract in
its relation to the interstate sale of subdivided land, since the remedy for overstatement of investment potential is either value-increase information or improvement-probability information,8 s whereas the remedy for land-retirement
55 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1964).
56 E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-1602 to 48-1632 (Cum.Supp. 1970).
57 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
58 Id. at 298.
59 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
60 Id. at 349.
61 1964 Hearings at 4. Mr. J. McBride, President of the National Association of License
Law Officials, made the distinction by saying:
Now we find that stress is being placed either on holding the land as an investment for resale later at a profit or buying it now, so that when retirement age is
reached the land will be paid for and ready for occupation.
62 - Id.
63 Cf. 1966 Hearings at 14.
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potential is a inore accurate description of,the land itself.6 .The, "economic
interest" factor would appear to be more relevant in evaluating investment potential than in purchasing land for eventual residence. The attraction in buying land
for investment is usually the ability to resell the land at a later time for a profit;
the attraction in buying land on which to reside is usually the location of the
land," the nature of the soil, 6 Or the climate.6 .7 The grey area of consideration,
of course, arises when land is bought for the purpose of residence at a future date
when improvements by the promoter or third party have been completed. 8 This
presents a situation inwhich land is to be purchased for building; but improvement is conditioned upon the actions of others.
In deciding the case of Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski"9 in 1961, the
Sunreme

nlourt of (lalifornia -,taterl•

Since the act does not make profit to the supplier of capital the test of what
is a security, it seems all the more clear that its objective is -to afford those
who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives in
legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a return on their capital in
one form or another 7 0°

This notion suggests that it is the nature of investment that the investor be given
a "fair chance" of obtaining what the seller suggests is obtainable. As applied to the
interstate sale of subdivided land, the implication would be that developers should
provide a "fair chance" to purchasers to realize those results which are necessarily
suggested in sales literature, telephone conversations, or other methods utilized
in selling and advertising."' For example, when the prospective purchaser is confronted with a statement such as "and * your mineral rights may prove to be
worth far more than you can possibly imagine *** because oil is beinrg actively
sought in Dade County!" 2 this suggestion should be enforced- with statistics
revealing the success of such explorations as well as the proximity of the offered
land to the exploratory wells.78
Silver Hills also suggests that the risk capital for the venture is being solicited
from the purchasers or investors, so that the complete success of the scheme
depends upon the successful sale of a certain number of memberships.7 4 However,
when this rationale is applied to the land development scheme, the possibility of
improvement and increase in value of the land sold is potentially nonexistent
64 Cf. id. at 22.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Cf. 1966 Hearings at 14. Mr. Morton Paulson, Business Editor of Newsjournal. Daytona Beach, Fla., quoting Mr. Robert Caro of Newsday:
I submit to you that the bigger problem in terms of its total implications is what
is going to happen to the tens of thousands of elderly couples who do move from the
cities and suburbs of the North to partially developed "retirement cities" in undeveloped counties in Florida and the Southwest. '

69 55 Cal.2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
70 Id. at 813, 361 P.2d at 908.
71 See, e.g., 1966 Heariniv at 10.
72 1966 Hearingsat 40.

73 Id. at 40-41.
74 361 P.2d at 908.

"
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because of the many areas from which purchasers are solicited,75 their lack of
unity," and their basic ignorance concerning the land purchased." If the land is
bought for investment and those things which would increase the value of the
land are not provided by the developer or some third person, the value will probably not increase."
It must be stated that in analyzing the notions propounded in these securities cases it is not being suggested that interstate land sales should necessarily
be regulated under securities laws or by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The analysis is simply helpful in coming to a more meaningful understanding of
the problems presented. Notions developed in the area of law on which title XIV
was patterned will be helpful in examining and evaluating the probable interpretation of that statute.
For example, in summarizing the criteria used to evaluate the existence of
a security, the court in Los Angeles Trust Deed and Mortgage Exchange v.
S.E.C. 9 stated:
The terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, the economic inducements -held out to the prospects, the results dependent on one other than
the purchaser, the common enterprise, all combine herein to make the second
trust deed notes "securities," as that term has been defined by the Supreme
Court. 80
These aspects of a transaction are likewise present in the usual interstate land
sale promotion of undeveloped subdivided land."1 The investor must be protected
in each phase of the operation in order to prevent schemes such as those publicized in the 1966 hearings. 2 The "plan of distribution," for example, should be
constructed to provide buyers with some chance for future land development.
Two other aspects common to transactions considered "securities" and also
to interstate land sales were emphasized in Blackwell u. Bentsen." It was there
stated that a majority of those purchasing citrus groves were inexperienced in this

75 1966 Hearings at 10. Mr. Herbert E. Wenig, Assistant Attorney General for the State
of California, stated, in 1964, that:
I wish to emphasize at this point, even if there is full disclosure, the sale of
undeveloped lots in a premature and remote subdivision for use as homesites or for
investment is inherently fraudulent. Once the promoter sells the lots, the scattered
ownership and diverse wishes of lot owners make concerted self-help most difficult.
All the risks of creating a livable homesite by the development of an adequate water
supply and the installations of streets, sewers and other utilities rest upon the indi.vidual buyers. The problem is accentuated by the remoteness of the subdivision.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Mr. Morton Paulson suggested:
If a promoter is permitted to say that "land values in Florida are rocketing up" or
that the land offers a "profit potential," or that it is in the "path of progress," then
that promoter should be compelled to submit evidence that the land in fact is a
worthwhile investment - evidence such as value increases in the past, values of comparable land nearby, and prospects for future demand for the land. 1966 Hearings
at 14.
79 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961).
80 Id. at 172.
81 See, e.g., note 39 supra.
82 Id.
83 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 925 (1954).
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type of cultivation"4 and usually lived far from the actual site of their purchase.85
It was evident that "purchase of the land is merely the conduit through which
the investment is accomplished." 86 Except in the example of a purchaser for
residence, the same points may be applied to land sales.
The rationale of the "passive investor," "the common scheme," and "economic inducement" was again applied in Continental Marketing Corporation v.
S.E.C."7 in order to include a promotion to invest in beavers under the securities
laws. However, the court also pointed out that "Its sales literature, couched in
such glowing terms as 'fabulous possibilities' and the 'road to riches,' presented to
the prospective purchaser a history of the development of the beaver industry .... ."s' This type of advertisement is analogous to advertisements used in
the sale of undeveloped land.
During the 1966 hearings, for instance, it became apparent that Florida promoters were selling land in swamps and other remote areas while advertising primarily in terms of the history of Florida's development.8 9 While not provided
with the actual potential for value-increase of the land offered for sale, the buyer
was given facts and figures seemingly related to his chances for successful investment.9 It is this misleading advertising, among other problems, to which
2
some states, 9 and now the federal government, have addressed themselves.
As early as 1920, the need for a commission to evaluate language used in
promotional schemes was recognized in State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co.93
Dealing with the problems of speculative schemes and the purpose and range of
its "Blue Sky Law," the court stated that "The commission is better qualified than
the average investor to ascertain whether any real values lie behind mere paper
evidences of value."94 This rationale was echoed during the 1966 hearings where
it was stated that registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission
would provide adequate disclosure in the interstate sale of undeveloped land.9
Although the prospectus issued to the potential buyer may be technical in certain
respects, examination of advertising materials by the Commission would prevent
the insertion of misleading facts and the omission of material facts.9
84 Id. at 692.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 693.
87 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1968).
88 Id. at 468.
89 See, e.g., note 39 supra.
90 Id.
91 States concerned primarily with misleading advertising: Alabama: ALA. CODE ch. 45, §
211 (1959); Arkansas: Aax. STAT. ANN. § 41-1961 (Gum. Supp. 1969); District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. ch. 14, § 22-1411 (1967); Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. § 157.21a
(Gum. Supp. 1971); Iowa: IowA CODE ANN. § 713.24 (Gum. Supp. 1970); Kentucky: Ky.
Rlv. STAT. ANN. ch. 434, § 434.270 (1969); Louisiana: LA. REv. STAT. tit. 51, § 411 (1965);
MiSsissippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 2003.5 (Gum. Supp. 1968); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 51-12-01 (Supp. 1969); South Dakota: S.D. CODE ch. 22-41, § 22-41-10 (1967); Texas:
TEx. Rnv. CIv. STAT. ANN. ch. 10, art. 5069-10.01 to 10.08 (1971); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN.
ch. 4, § 76-4-1 (1953); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. ch. 4, § 59.1-44 (1968 Replacement Volume); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE ANN. art. 2, §§ 32-2-1 to 32-2-3 (1966).
92 Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (2) (B) (Supp. V,
1970).
93 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920).
94 Id. at 53, 177 N.W. at 938.

95 1966 Hearings at 164.
96 Id.
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In deciding the status of undivided equity interests in land syndications, the
97
court in S.E.C. v. Royal Hawaiian Management Corporation
set out essential
disclosure elements for investment purposes. The court said:
The brochures used by the defendants in their offerings are lacking in any
solid information from which an investor may ascertaina. the background of RHMC and its sources, if any;
b. the nature and extent of its commitments in connection with Poipu
and Awakee acquisitions;
c. the impact of those commitments upon its ability to carry out the
terms of its contracts and agreements with investors;
d. the nature and quality of the title, if any, that RHMC may have
in the Poipu and Awakee tracts ....98
One may obviously see the necessity for such information where undeveloped
land is advertised as possessing extreme investment potential from improvements
to be installed by the developer. It is essential that the investor know the preparations which have been made and the contracts which have been signed. Without
this information, the investor is unable to evalute the chances for completion of
the improvements and the increased land value. The "nature and quality of
title," however, are critical to both investment and residential goals.99
Two additional points must be mentioned in relation to the notion of what is
commonly known as "The Howey Formula" (transactions in which profits are
derived through the efforts of third persons other than investors are considered
securities0 0 ) and also in relation to the general interpretation of state Blue Sky
Laws. As has been demonstrated, undeveloped land sold in interstate commerce
presents a situation closely analogous to that described by the Howey formulanamely, profits are made through the efforts of others. It should be noted that
the formula has been widely accepted in both federal and state courts. 1 ' The
suggestions in the 1966 hearings that interstate land sales should be regulated by
the Securities and Exchange Commission resulted from the fact that through the
Howey formula and its general acceptance, securities law had reached the position
where inclusion of real estate would not have violated established principles. 0 2
Also, the S.E.C. and state securities commissions had handled registration and
prospectus filing and dissemination for many years.'
A brief look at interpretations of the purposes of states' Blue Sky Laws will
give some idea of the potential adaptability of these laws to the sale of undeveloped land promotional schemes. The goals of prevention of fraud and
deceit, 0 unnecessary risk,'0 s and the need for "reasonable licensing and registra97 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,982 (D. Hawaii 1967).
98 Id. 96,338.
99 See note 39 supra.
100 S.E.C. v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
101 United States v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607, 609-10 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
999 (1966) ; Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435, 438 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
824 (1961); Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690, 693 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
925 (1954); S.E.C. v. Orange Grove Tracts, 210 F. Supp. 81, 82 (E.D. Mass. 1962); Emery
v. So-Soft, Inc., 199 N.E.2d 120, 123 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964).
102 -Compare S.E.C. v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) with note 39 supra.
103

1966 Hearings at 90.

104 State v. Weigel, 165 N.W.2d 695, 698 (N.D. 1969).
105 Bronaugh v. R.E. Dredging Co., 16 Ohio 2d 35, 242 N.E.2d 572, 576 (1968).
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tion requirements designed to protect the public from its own stupidity, gullibility,
and avariciousness"' 08 concerning the sale of securities are also relevant considerations in the sale of undeveloped land. Other considerations expressed in
dealing with the state laws have been the need to construe these statutes liberally
to afford maximum'protection to the public' and to confront directly "the
capacity for harm and danger to the public' e0 by realizing that the Act "is
•designed to be prophylactic if possible, remedial only if necessary."'0 0 Since one
of the main criticisms leveled against state laws and the postal acts has been their
after-the-fact application," 0 interpretation of the securities laws as "prophylactic"
would have been a possible solution to such criticism.
w
As was stated in Oil Lease Service, Inc. v. Stephenson:
"
In determining whether an instrument is a security within the meaning
of the code, the court may look through mere form to substance. (Ogier v.
Pacific Oil & Gas Development Corp., 132 Cal. App. 2d 496, 282 P. 2d 574)
and consider the facts and circumstances surrounding its execution to
ascertain the true intent of the parties, their mutual purposes and expectations and the potentialities of the rights acquired by the purchaser. 12
An examination of the investment-type interstate land sale transaction
reveals a situation strikingly similar to the typical investment contract. However,
the central consideration is the nature of the analysis used in determining the
existence of the security. In seeking to ascertain the "true intent of the parties,"
their "mutual purposes and expectations" and the "potentialities of the rights
acquired by the purchaser,""' the court has isolated the exact criteria which
conceal the inequities perpetrated upon the public. In most instances a look at
the "intent of the parties" is sufficierit to disclose the reckless nature of the promotion.
Identifying the "mutual purposes and expectations" of the parties would
also aid in differentiating the legitimate developer from the irresponsible promoter. For example, as was pointed out in the 1966 hearings, certain developers
went out of their way to supply air transportation to prospective buyers to see the
land offered." 4 These men provided a great service to the public."0 The "mutual
purposes and expectations" of parties to such promotions seems to be mutually
complementary with satisfaction derived by both the promoter and the purchaser.
However, an investigation into the "mutual purposes and expectations" of pertdes
to one 'of the less humanitarian schemes 6 presents "purposes and expectations"
mutually exclusive. For example, the "developer" is concerned only in selling his
land regardless of the effect upon the buyer, and the buyer is interested in seeking
106

Id.

107 State v. March, 247 Ore. 266, 428 P.2d 894, 896 (1967).
108 Jackson v. Robertson, 90 Ariz. 405, 368 P.2d 645, 648 (1962).
109 Id.
110 1966 Hearings at 198.
111 162 Cal.App. 2d 100, 327 P.2d 628 (1958).
112 Id. at 104, 327 P.2d at 632.
113 Id.
114 1966 Hearings at 201-08 (testimony of Robert P. McCulloch, jr., Vice President, McCtilloch Properties, Inc., Los Angeles, Cal;).'
115 See generally 1966 Hearings at 204.
116 See note 38 supra.
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a fine plot of land upon which to build his residence for retirement or in which to
invest his money. If the seller has no concern whatever for the potential investor,
the purposes and expectations of the parties cannot complement each other.
Of course, the same may be said about the "potentialities of the rights acquired -by
the purchaser." He may only judge his potentialities and make an intelligent
investment in relation to the clarity of information, honesty, and mutual purpose
which the promoter exercises in dealing with him.
One final consideration used in the securities field which also applies to the
interstate sale of undeveloped land is demonstrated by the case of S.E.C. v.
Ralston Purina Co."' In determining the correct analysis which must be applied
in interpreting the "private offering" exemption of section 4(1) of the Securities
Act of 1933,"' the court stated that "The focus of inquiry should be on the need
of the offerees for the protections afforded by registration.""' 9 This consideration
is also of primary importance in the subdivision sales area since the purchasers
are usually quite vulnerable to deception because of the vast area from which
buyers are sought,"' the purchasers' ignorance concerning the offered land,"' and
the distance between the buyers and the land sold."' These investors must be
provided maximum protection. It is essential, therefore, that title XIV be the best
attempt this country may provide to eliminate existing abuses.
The principles derived from the examination of investment securities" 3 must
now be considered in relation to the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act"
in order to critically evaluate the Act's potential for solving the problems of the
sale of undeveloped land.
V. The Legislative Development of Title XIV
The first major discovery of losses incurred through fraudulent practices in
the sale of land was made in the hearings conducted by the Subcommittee on
Frauds and Misrepresentations Affecting the Elderly of the Special Committee
on Aging of the United States Senate, May 18, 1964."' Because of the many
inequities found in those proceedings, follow-up hearings were held before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency of the United States
Senate, on June 21, 22 and August 18, 1966. Finally, two days of hearings were
held on S. 275, which was a full disclosure statute essentially the same as title
XIV.
Hearings were then held between March 5 and March 22, 1968, before the
Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Committee on Banking and
Currency United States Senate," 6 concerning proposed housing legislation of
117 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
118 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1964).
119 346 U.S. at 127.
120 1966 Hearings at 10.
121 Id. at 9.
122 Id. at 10.
123 Compare S.E.C. v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) with note 39 supra.
124 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (Supp. V, 1970).
125 1964 Hearings.
126 Hearings on Prepared Housing Legislation for 1968 before the Subcomm. on Housing
and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1
(1968).
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1968-of which title XIV was to become an integral part. Remarkably little
was said about the title itself. Senator Williams did, however, remark to Robert
C. Weaver, Secretary of the Housing and Urban Development Department:
As you know, there is a great deal of sentiment that the interstate sale of
underdeveloped land be regulated through full disclosure. The original
bill which I introduced put it in tandem with the Securities and Exchange
Commission provisions and gave jurisdiction to the 1SEC.
I have amended
27
the proposed legislation to give jurisdiction to HUD.
Another witness at the hearings, Mr. Fred C. Tucker, Jr., Chairman of the
Realtors' Washington Committee, National Association of Real Estate Boards,
stated that ".... the author of the bill has substituted the Department of Housing
and Urban Development for the Securities and Exchange Commission in order
that the bill could be offered as part of the pending housing bill."'2 8 Mr. Tucker
went on td say that his organization was in favor of rejecting this title"29 because
it was too drastic of a solution to the problem.'
He remarked:
It would take 'after the fact' hearings by HUD to ascertain the veracity
of statements of fact set forth in the required registration statements. We
believe that the Post Office would be as effective as HUD in quickly putting
an end to the promoters of fraudulent schemes by denying them use of the
mails' 31
Another reference to the Full Disclosure Act was made in a listing of
National Association of Home Builders positions not covered in its official statement. The item refers to S. 275, the Interstate Land Sales Disclosure bill, and
says, "NAHB favors a substitute approach which would give HUD, rather than
SEC, this authority, and which would utilize the existing enforcement powers of
the Federal Trade Commission to carry out its sanctions."'3 2 As has been mentioned, title XIV does have IUD rather than SEC as its administering agency."'
The Committee on Banking and Currency which presented its report to the
Senate on May 15, 1968, in its explanation of the bill (S.3497), stated that "The
necessity for this legislation was made very apparent during hearings held by the
Special Committee on Aging in 1964, and by the Securities Subcommittee of
this committee in 1966 and 1967."'"" It was mentioned that "false and misleading
promises" had been utilized in transactions affecting the elderly3 5 and that more
than $50 million in losses between 1962 and 1966 had been reported by the Post
Office Department.'36
The basic requirements of the bill were set out in this way:
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

Id. at 61.
Id. at 456.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 322.
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act 15 U.S.C. § 1715 (Supp. V, 1970).
S. R n. No. 1123, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 109 (1968).
Id.
Id.
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The seller of underdeveloped land covered by this title would be required to inform the purchaser not only of the desirable aspects, but also
The purchaser will then be able to make an
of any undesirable 3 aspects.
7
intelligent decision.

It was also pointed out that the bill was not meant to impede any state real
estate commission, but rather was to cooperate with state authorities. 38
Although the foregoing somewhat emphasizes the majority opinion of the
Committee, the remarks of the minority are interesting in light of the striking
similarities between subdivision sales problems and investment contracts or
"securities." The minority," 9 for example, while concurring in the need to
protect the public from unscrupulous promoters 4 ' and to prevent such promoters
from "taking advantage of loopholes in State and Federal laws,"'' was disturbed
by the fact that:
This bill, which places the administrative powers in the Department of
Housing and Urban Development rather than in the Securities and Exof Justice, as did other proposals,
change Commission or the Department
14 2
was not subject to public hearings.

S. 275 which had received much support from the federal agencies themselves
had the Securities and Exchange Commission, not the Housing and Urban
Development Department, as its administering body. 4" For example, a statement made by the Housing and Urban Development Department said:
In our view, the SEC is best equipped to receive and record the registration statements required under the bill since the Commission already
performs a similar role regarding administration and enforcement of registrarequirements relating to the sale of corporate stocks and
tion and disclosure
4
other securities.1

Besides being concerned with the change of the administering agency, the
group was also greatly influenced by a poll of governors taken in regard to the
1966 proposal. The results of the poll were stated as follows:
In answer to letters written to all 50 Governors on the question of the
1966 SEC proposal of Federal land sales legislation, we received 42 replies,
32 of which opposed the proposed Federal statute and expressed a willingness
to take steps needed to handle the problem on a state level. Only four
favored the land sales bill requiring registration with a Federal agency, and
six gave vague or noncommittal replies.' 45

137 Id. at 110.
138 Id. at 111.
139 Mr. Wallace F. Bennett from Utah, Mr. John G. Tower from Texas, and Mr. Bourke
B. Hickenlooper from Iowa.
140 S. REP. No. 1123, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 197 (1968).
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 199.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 200.
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In essence, then, the minority's main exception was to the lack of hearings and
its concurrence with the governors that this was a state problem.
.On May 24, 1968; Senator Williams of New Jersey, in supporting the
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act stated that the interstate sale of undeveloped land had grown 'to an estimated $1 billion per year, 4" that a great
number of such sales had been made by long-distance conversations, personal
solicitations, and that the buyer seldom sees the land and is usually forced to
rely on the salesman's representations."4 The Senator then stated that "The only
purpose of this legislation is to give the purchaser the necessary information upon
which he can make his own investment decisions."' 4
An amendment to the bill which provided for an exemption from the Act
was presented by Senator Fulbright on May 28, 1968, and was subsequently
approved. The amendment read as follows:
The sale 'or lease of real estate which is free and clear of all liens, encumbrances, and adverse claims [is exempt from the act] if each and every
purchaser or his or her spouse has personally inspected the lot which he
purchases and if the developer executes a written affirmation to that effect
to be made a matter of record in accordance with rules and regulations of
the Secretary."'t
The Senator's major premise seemed ,to be that

"...

it is hard to see how a

purchaser would not have an opportunity to know what he is buying if he has
inspected the lot himself. "' O' It may be submitted, however, that the exact distinction between the buyer of land for residence and the buyer of land for investment purposes is adequate to rebut the Senator's, argument. For example,
although a person may be adequately informed about land on which he intends
to live by viewing the land,- he may- not be able to ascertain the potential value
increase by seeing the land alone.
On May 28, 1968, Senator Williams pointed out that probably the major
impetus for interstate land sales legislation at this time was the speech made by
President Johnson on February 16, 1967, concerning consumer protection. 1 ' The
President said:
The interstate mail order sales of such land runs into many millions of
dollars each year. "Slippery 'language and omission of important facts"
have given too many buyers grossly distorted impressions of the land they
later purchased.
They have wasted much of their life savings on a useless piece of
desert or swampland. But only the Federal Government can have effective
authority over interstate mail order sales.
I recommend the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act of 1967 to
afford the
public greater safeguards against sharp and unscrupulous
practices.152
146

114 CoNG. REc. 14974 (1968).
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When S. 3497 was finally referred to the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 5' the House struck all of the Senate bill after the enacting clause and inserted its own bill (H.R. 17989"4 which did not include an Interstate Land
Sales Act). This was not accepted by the Senate and a conference committee of
both bodies filed a conference report on July 23, 1968V' 5 The report stated that
"The purpose of full disclosure is to deter or prohibit the sale of land by use of
the mails or other channels of interstate56commerce through misrepresentation of
material facts relating to the property."'
All the exemptions of the Senate bill were adopted except for section
1702(a) (10) which provided that:
Absent any purpose to evade the provisions of the title, the sale or
lease of real estate is exempt where the purchaser or his or her spouse has
personally inspected the lot purchased. However, to gain the exemption,
the real57estate must be free and clear of liens, encumbrances, and adverse
claims.'
Title XIV of the Interstate Land Sales Act was, then, essentially the same as title
XIII of the Senate bill. The Conference Report was accepted by both the
House 58 and Senate 9 and became law on August 1, 1968.16
VI. Analysis of Title XIV
Having examined the problems presented by the interstate sale of subdivided
land, the inability of state laws combined with postal and Federal Trade Commission acts to adequately remedy these problems, analogous securities problems,
and federal proposals to eliminate the existing "loopholes," one must examine
the state of the law as expressed through title XIV to evaluate the protection
provided for the investor. Particular emphasis will be addressed in this Note to
those provisions of the statute which seem to attack areas formerly unprotected
by state and federal law.
Following the definitions presented in section 1701 of the Act,' 6 ' section
1702 begins:
Sec. (a) Unless the method of disposition is adopted for the purpose of
evasion of this title, the provisions of this title shall not apply to(1) the sale or lease of real estate not pursuant to a common2 promotional plan to offer or sell fifty or more lots in a subdivision.
Although some state laws provide exemptions for promotional plans to sell or offer
153
154
155
156
157

158
159
160
161
162

Id. at 15532.
Id. at 20597.
H.R.REP. No. 1785, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
Id. at 161.
15 U.S.C. § 1702(a) (10) (Supp. V, 1970).
114 CONG. REc. 23691 (1968).
Id. at 23292.
Id. at 25004.
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (Supp. V, 1970).
Id. § 1702(a).
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to sell up to twenty-five lots in a subdivision, 6 ' the "promotional plan" aspect is
the more relevant consideration.
The usual interstate sales scheme deals with far more than fifty lots; however, it is the scheme itself which is the basis of proposed development or predicted land value increases." 4 Improvements suggested, value increase assured,
and the feasibility of future residence must all be considered in evolving the
notion of "promotional plan." These considerations take land sales out of a pure
real estate context and necessitate registration. As has been stated, the number
fifty is reasonable in terms of an interstate venture as long as the promoter is
prevented from dividing his land into smaller parcels or developments for the
purpose of circumventing the Act's provisions."' A strict evaluation of applications for exemptions must be made by the Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration (OILSR) since, "Unlike the federal securities laws, an exemption from
the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act literally serves also to exempt one
from the liability provisions of the Act.""'
Subsection (a) (3) of the exemption provisions 6 ' states that:
Sec. (a) Unless the method of disposition is adopted for the purpose
of evasion of this title, the provisions of this title shall not apply to-

(3) The sale or lease of any improved land on which there is a
residential, commercial, or industrial building, or to the sale or lease of
land under a contract obligating the6 8 seller to erect such a building
thereon within a period of two years.'

This section is addressed primarily to the sale of land for the purpose of residence.
It became evident from the 1964 and 1966 hearings that much of the land
sold was incapable of supporting buildings. 9 By allowing this exemption where
the building already exists or where the burden of seeing to its construction is put
upon the seller, the problem is eliminated for the buyer. This provision should be
effective in preventing sellers from suggesting unsuitable land for building purposes. The necessity for the contract between the seller and buyer is seen in situations where buildings which would have increased land value were not built.
This problem usually arises in the context of off-site improvements to be built.
Classification of such transactions under the "investment contract" rationale is
appropriate since profits are "to come from the efforts of others."'7 0
One exemption which focuses upon the land for residence aspect of inter163 E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3301(6) (Cur. Supp. 1970).
164 1966 Hearings at 10.
165 15 U.S.C. § 1702(a).
166 Feferman, Interstate Land S les Full DisclosureAct, 33 TEXAs B.J. 628 (1970).
167 15 U.S.C. § 1702(a) (3) (Supp. V, 1970).
168 Id.
169 See the 1966 Hearings at 10. There Mr. Morton Paulson, Business Editor, Newsjournal, Daytona Beach, Florida, states that:
By contrast, much of the acreage sold by mail is in such condition that it could
not be developed, even if there were any demand for development, without heavy
expenditures for surveys, drainage, clearing, filling, and roadbuilding.
170 1966 Hearings at 13.
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state land sales, but which seems inadequate in regard to the investment-type
sale is subsection 10.' This provision states:
(10) the sale or lease of real estate which is free and clear of all liens,
encumbrances, and adverse claims [is exempt from the act] if each and
every purchaser or his or her spouse has made a personal on-the-lot inspection of the real estate which he purchased and if the developer executes
a written affirmation to that effect to be made a matter
of record in ac72
cordance with rules and regulations of the Secretary.
Again, the distinction between the sale for residence and the investment sale
is critical in the area of interstate sale of subdivided land. When a person is
buying a lot on which to build his residence, a good look at the plot is in most
instances sufficient to guard against an unscrupulous promotion scheme. He sees
the kind of terrain, experiences the climate, and can then make up his mind
whether or not this is the place where he wants to live. However, the person
buying land for the purpose of reselling at a later date for a profit does not
receive the same protection from a personal inspection of the land. Analogizing
to the field of securities, it may be said that:
Disclosure of the history and operations of a business may provide
guidance for investing in that business. Disclosure of the topography, title
and environment
of a parcel of real estate betrays little about its investment
73
potential.
This exemption appears to provide a total exemption from the Act to the
promoter who sells his plots by suggesting extravagant investment potential and
who manages to get the potential investor to visit the plot. The possibility of a
promoter paying the buyer's expenses to visit the lot is unlikely, however, in most
instances. Yet it must be remembered that many such sales have occurred in
tourist states where the buyer is already present and is given the full sales treatment. Therefore, subsection 10 should be amended to eliminate this exemption,
and other provisions of the Act empowering the Secretary to elicit additional information' 7 4 should be construed to provide the prospective investor with protection as adequate as is afforded to the residential buyer.
Another exemption is provided by the fact that:
(b) The Secretary may from time to time, pursuant to rules and regulations issued by him, exempt from any of the provisions of this title any
subdivision or any lots in a subdivision, if he finds that the enforcement
of this title with respect to such subdivisions or lots is not necessary in the
public interest and for the protection of purchasers by reason of the small
amount involved or the limited character of the public offering. 7 5
Title XIV was passed to remedy large-scale promotions and not to harass
171 15 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(10) (Supp.V, 1970).
172 Id.
173 Stem, Proposed Federal Regulations of Subdivision Sales, 43 L.A. B. BULL. 287 (1968).
174 15 U.S.C. §§ 1706, 1714 (Supp. V, 1970).
175 Id. § 1402(b).
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sellers of limited holdings selling most of thei land within their state boundaries."" This provision allows the Secretary some discretion so as not 'to overburden the legitimate developer where the protection of the Act is unnecessary.
Section 1703... insures that a purchaser is either provided with a property
He may also "... . revoke
report or he may void his contract at-his own option.'
such contract or agreement within forty-eight h6urs, where he has receiv ed the
property report less than forty-eight hours before he signed the contract or agreement .. ."1' "To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud' 8 0 or to
materially misrepresent information relied upon by the buyer is made expressly
unlawful."8 Section 1703 seeks to prevent irresponsible schemes by requiring registration and a property report to disclose facts essential to an understanding of
the purchase or investment made. However, the revocation of contract provision
confronts the abuses already mentioned in this area only if the report which the
buyer ultimately receives possesses the information necessary for an intelligent
:
investment decision or purchase.
Information regarding topography and climate in residence promotions and
financial records and value increases in investment promotions should be provided. The beneficial nature of section 1703 may only be evaluated in terms of
what information is required for registration purposes and for inclusion in the
property report. For example, if the purchaser is provided with a report which
contains true but inadequate information, he will be in a position similar to that
of the person who receives materials advertising land with all the features
identified but the fact of a flood control easement omitted. 8 2 The information
in the report must be material, essential, and meaningful in terms of what the
buyer is buying.
Section 1703, while possessing some of the basic characteiistics of the state
consumer fraud and false advertising statutes,8 8 contains the additional ingredient of required before-the-fact disclosure through registration-and primarily
through the property report. It is for this reason that the report must contain
necessary information foi an intelligent decision on the part of the buyer. -Without an adequate disclosure requirement, sectiofn 1703 would be little better than
many of the existing state statutes.
Under section 1704, information contained in, or filed with, the statement of
record is made available to the public. 4 If the report furnished to the prospective buyer contains insufficient information for his particular transaction, he may
obtain information contained in or submitted with the statement of record. For
example, if a purchaser for investment does not have adequate information concerning business solvency of corporations or other organizations which are to com176
177
178
179

See generally 1966 Hearings at 67.
15 U.S.C. § 1703 (Supp. V, 1970).
Id. § 1703(b).
Id.

180 Id. § 1703(a) (2) (A).
181
182

Id. § 1703(a) (2) (B).
See generally note 39 supra.

183 E.g., ALA. CODE ch. 45, § 211 (1959) (false advertising); Aiuz. Rnv, STAT. ANN. ch.
10, §§ 44-1521 to 44-1534 (1967) (consumer fraud). The false advertising statutes are generally aimed at prohibiting misleading advertising while the consumer fraud statutes attempt to
keep abreast of modem schemes used to defraud consumers.
,
184 15 U.S.C. §,1704(d)" (Supp. ,Y;1970).
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plete work which will substantially increase the value of his land, he may be able
to obtain such facts from the statement of record.
Information and documents required as part of the statement of record are
presented in section 1705. This section requires a statement of the topography,185
the relation of the lots to existing streets and roads,186 condition of title, 8 7 statement of general terms and conditions,'88 present access, sewage, and other public
utilities plus distance to nearest municipalities, and the nature of improvements to
be installed by the developer and his estimated schedule for completion.8 9 Also
required are a copy of articles of incorporation or other association,' copies of
instruments witnessing easements,'
financial statements required by the Secretary,'92 and "such other information and such other documents and certifications as the Secretary may require as being reasonably necessary or appropriate
93
for the protection of purchasers."'
This section seems to possess the potential to cure the problems formerly
faced in the interstate sale of subdivided land. Careful scrutiny on the part of the
Secretary in conjunction with strict compliance with the provisions of section
1705 would leave little room for deception or fraud. The purchaser of land for
the purpose of residence would be protected by the disclosure of topography,
title, nearness to cities, improvements, access, and easements, while the purchaser
for investment would be protected by these same facts plus articles of association
and incorporation, financial statements, and additional information required by
the Secretary. The Secretary could require land value increase reports; and if
the value increase were expected to result from improvements constructed by the
developer, the Secretary could require disclosure of the contracts for completion
or the resources available for completion. Though not explicitly stated in section
1705, it appears that if an investment sales promotion were proposed with profits
to come from the efforts of persons other than the buyer or developer, the Secretary could require information regarding the probable success of the completion
of such efforts.
In some situations this information could be critical. For example, if a
promoter offers to sell land somewhere in the vicinity of a model city, such as the
Disney Project in Florida, 94 the purchaser should be allowed to obtain information regarding the probability of completion of the project, as well as the distance
in miles of his plot from the project site. Elements essential to the potentialities
of his investment also include the desirability and capacity of his land to afford
expansion for the project or for development in the near vicinity. At the very
least, he should be allowed to obtain facts sufficient to assure him of the legitimacy
of the promotion and that he is investing his money with a fair chance of obtaining the suggested profits.
185
187

Id. § 1705(2).
Id.
Id. § 1705(3).

186
188

Id. § 1705(4).

189

Id. § 1705(5).

190
191
192
193
194

Id. § 1705(7).
Id. § 1705(10).
Id. § 1705(11).
Id. § 1705(12).
The Disney Project was mentioned briefly in the 1966 Hearings at 10.
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Sections, 1706(b)-(f) essentially provide for suspension of a statement of

record for inaccuracy or incompleteness,' 9 5 changes in material facts, 198 or untruth or omissions.' 97 The sections further provide that:
The Secretary or anyone designated by him shall have access to and may
demand the production of any books and papers of, and may administer
oaths and affirmations to and examine, the developer, any agents, or any
other person, in respect of any matter relevant to the examination. 98
Addressing itself directly to the problem left open by the state false advertising statutes, the postal statutes, and the Federal Trade Commission acts, the
section goes beyond the prevention of fraud and intentional deception and aims at
any material facts which seek to mislead. However, the section is important
primarily for its express language dealing with the omission as well as misrepresentation of material facts. Now, the developer may not provide the facts he
wishes, and neglect to mention those specifics detrimental to his promotion.
Two aspects of section 1706 are particularly susceptible to an interpretation
which would remedy the problems common to residential as well as investment
purchases. The first aspect deals with revelation of material facts.'99 If the
revelation of material facts is a necessity, it is obvious that such facts as title, topography, and others mentioned in section 1705 must be disclosed. However, in
the case of land bought for investment, this section could be interpreted to include
facts such as the probability of completion of structures and improvements.
The second aspect of the section which could provide an added amount of
protection if liberally construed is the portion dealing with the production of
records of "the developer, any agents, or any other person, in respect of any
matter relevant to the examination."2 ' Again, this section could well cover the
investment sale and the sale of residence by calling in any records necessary to
insure the legitimacy of a particular promotion. In the event a particular subdivision was already registered and it was subsequently learned that potential
investors were receiving advertising materials suggesting extraordinary investment
potential with profits dependent solely on the completion of structures by third
persons, those in control of construction could be called to give some idea of the
progress, estimated dates, and probabilities of completion. This information
would be essential to a decision by the Secretary whether or not to suspend the
registration.
Section 1707 refers to the information required in the property report and
states that such reports "need not include the documents referred to in paragraphs (7) to (11), inclusive, of section 1705."*"' A serious problem is presented
by this section because paragraphs (7) to (11) are the exact paragraphs which
provide protection for the investment-type sale. The property report which is
distributed to the purchaser before sale would provide the title, access, and other
195

15 U.S.C. § 1706(b) (Supp. V, 1970).

196 Id.§ 1706(c).

197 Id. § 1706(d).
198 Id. § 1706(e).
199 Id. § 1706(d).

200 Id.§ 1706(e).
201

Id. § 1707(a).
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considerations necessary to make an intelligent decision in buying land for
residence. The investment buyer is provided with the same type report, but
without information concerning the corporation or association, financial reports,
and value-increase statistics which are essential to an intelligent investment
decision. Section 1707 should be amended to provide that the property report
include section 1705 in its entirety-or at least as much as is necessary to protect
the investment purchaser as well as the purchaser for residence. An alternative
procedure of value to the sophisticated investor would be to amend section
1704(d) to allow copies of the statement of record to be furnished to prospective
land purchasers without cost upon application.
Title XIV does not pre-empt state law. Although pre-emption was vigorously urged by at least one witness at the 1966 hearings, 2 section 1708 provides
that the Act be administered in cooperation with state authorities." Also pointed
out is the fact that materials filed with state agencies may be found acceptable as
a statement of record, 0 4 and the Act in no way affects the jurisdiction of such
agencies."'
Because of the lack of "political expediency" involved in attempting to preempt state law in this area,2" it was hoped that the states would not repeal or
cease to enact legislation aimed at subdivision sale control, but would somehow
be stimulated to enact such legislation.0 ' Section 1708 makes it clear that the
more vigorous the campaign at the state level, the less problem the developer will
have in complying with federal law. If the interstate sale of subdivided land is
not to be considered an investment security, the adoption of the Uniform Land
Sales Practices Act, supplemented by the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
Act, should provide adequate protection in most instances. However, this assumes
that title XIV will be liberally construed so as to provide maximum protection to
the investor as well as to the purchaser for residence.
Probably the most interesting development to be viewed as the administration of the statute proceeds will be the development of section 1709 on civil
liabilities.20 ' There is little doubt after looking at the legislative history of the
Act that it is intended to be administered as a "full disclosure" statute only.20 8
However, it was enacted to remedy fraud and deception in the interstate sale of
202 1966 Hearings at 150. Mr. Jon Moyle, Counsel to the Florida Installment Land Sales
Board, testified:
My position, Senator Mondale, is, if any Federal legislation is enacted, 'it should
preempt the field and it should do a complete and adequate job of supervising and
regulating this industry and if it did preempt the field and it did do what I personally thought was an adequate job in controlling this type industry, I would wholeheartedly endorse it.
203 15 U.S.C. § 1708 (Supp. V, 1970).
2C4 Id. § 1708(a).
205 Id. § 1708(b).
206 See, e.g., 1966 Hearings at 161-62:
Senator Mondale. I can't imagine this, Senator, the States agreeing to a bill
that in effect takes over completely and totally Federal control of real estate at the
local level, provided it is being sold in interstate commerce, invests all that authority
in some Federal body.
Senator Williams. I can't either; but not only that, as a practical matter it
would never happen. It would never happen.
207 See generally 1966 Hearings at 169.
208 15 U.S.C. § 1709 (Supp. V, 1970).
209 See Section V supra.
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land, and. it potentially contains what is necessary to provide maximum protection.
Section.1709 provides that any person who acquires a -lot in a subdivision
may sue the developer who sold or leased him the lot if the statement of record
was in effect and "contained an'untrue statement of a material fact or omitted
to state a material fact required to be stated therein."210 The purciaser of the
lot is given the right to sue any developer or agent who sells or leases a lot in' a
subdivision "by means of a property, report-which contained an untrue statement
of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated
therein."2 1 Damages are set out in subsection (C) which states:
(c) The suit authorized under subsection (a) or (b) may be to recover
such damages as shall represent the difference between the amount paid
for the lot and the reasonable cost of any improvements thereto, and
the lesser of (1) the value thereof as of the time such suit was brought, or
(2) the price at which such lot shall ha-e been disposed of in a bona fide
market transaction before suift, or (3) the price at which such lot shall have
of after suit in a bona fide market transaction but before
been disposed
21 2
judgment.
Contribution is also provided by this section.
The aforementioned provisions are in complete accord with the idea of full
disclosure and deal primarily with the aspect of facts presented to the prospective
purchaser. Once these facts are disclosed, the implication is that the problem of
land fraud should be solved by intelligent decisions on the part of the purchaser.
Therefore, these provisions are 'concerned with disclosure of facts but are not
aimed at fraud or deception in the transaction itself. For example,, deception
not arising from statements material to the statement of record or property report
would seemingly not be covered. However, it is just at this point that the great
potential of section 1709 lies. Section 1709(b) states:
(b) Any developer or agent, who sells or leases a lot in a subdivision(1) in violation of section 1703 ...
212
(2) ... may be sued by the purchaser of such lot.
Recalling that section 1703 (a) (2) prohibits the employment of "any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud" in the sale, lease; or offer to sell or lease any lot in
a subdivision,214 it becomes apparent that a liberal interpretation of section 1709
could provide a remedy for the buyer-not only in the disclosure aspect of the
transaction, but also in any other aspect of'the transaction which may be fraudulent. This kind of interpretation would require a reading of the section
analogous to that given Rule lOb-5 of the Securities 'Exchange Act of 1934.
Since the best analogy provided for dealing with land promotion schemes is that
of investment contracts, the interpretationsis a definite possibility. It will bein:
210
211.
212
213
214

15 U.S.C. § 1709(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
Id. § 1709(b) (2).
Id. § 1709(c).
Id. § 1709(b).
Id. § 1703(a) (2).
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teresting to see the interpretation given this section when finally brought before
the courts. In the interest of preventing fraud and deception in all facets of land
sales, section 1709 should be liberally construed to provide maximum protection
for investors and purchasers.
The Office of Interstate Land Sales Registration has brought two actions
in the district courts 15 pursuant to section 1714 which provides that the Secretary
or his appointees may bring an action for injunction in the United States district
courts when a person "is engaged or about to engage in any acts or practices
which constitute or will constitute a violation of the provisions of this title." '
It is still early to ascertain just how effective OILSR will be in preventing land
sales abuses; however, a broad interpretation and administration of the statute
should cause developers to be on guard when preparing their promotional
schemes.
Section 1714 also provides a means by which the Secretary may keep the
law as modem as the schemes devised to circumvent it. For example, he is given
the authority to publish information and to investigate any
facts, conditions, practices, or matters which he may deem necessary or
proper to aid in the enforcement of the provisions of this title, in the prescribing of rules and regulations thereunder, or in securing information to
further legislation concerning the matters
serve as a basis for recommending
217
to which this title relates.
It is hoped that OILSR will be active in seeking to devise new methods of dealing with the varied types of land sales schemes which invariably manage to
circumvent existing law. This tendency to keep abreast of the field of land sales
will hopefully be expressed in a wide interpretation of the Act.
Other provisions of the Act are essential to its enforcement and administration. It is suggested, however, that if the sections mentioned are interpreted
rigorously, full protection for the purchaser of interstate subdivided land may
become a reality.
VII. Conclusion
Although the interstate sale of subdivided land has for many years caused
hardships upon purchasers expecting fine land for retirement or excellent investment opportunities, the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, if liberally
interpreted by both the courts and the OILSR, has the potential to remedy
existing abuses. In conjunction with adequate control at the state level, the Act
is sufficient to provide jurisdictional and before-the-fact protection. Although
legislative history and early administration of title XIV seem to suggest merely
an intent to mandate full disclosure, broad interpretation of certain provisions of
the Act by the courts could provide remedies for abuses in the sale of retirement
lands as well as investment lands in all aspects of the transaction.
An investigation of the evolution of investment securities cases and the
215 Romney v. Gulf Land Co., Civil No. 3973 (S.D. Miss., Aug. 11, 1970) (permanent injunction); Romney v. Geotis, Civil No. 70-752-5 (D. Mass., Sept. 8, 1970) (consent decree).
216 15 U.S.C. § 1714 (Supp. V, 1970).
217 Id. § 1714(b).
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principles utilized therein shows the courts have adequate precedent for construing the provisions of the Act in a manner suitable to the protection of purchasers and investors. It is now left to the courts to realize the extent of protection
needed by investors in interstate land sales. By applying principles from securities
law in interpreting the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, OILSR and
the courts now have the opportunity to cure many of the existing abuses. It
remains to be seen whether or not this approach will be used in providing maximum protection for purchasers and investors.
Glen A. Anger

[Summer, 1971]
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STATn

STATUTES

REGULATINo

State

THE SALE op UNDEvELoPED

LAND

Administered

Penalty

Focus

Alabama

false advertising

criminal offense

$25 to $1000
and/or 60 days

prohibit misleading
advertising

Alaska

U.L.S.P.A.1

bep't of Commerce

extensive

registration and public
offering statement

Arizona

Consumer fraud

Att'y General

extensive

intentional deception
prohibit misleading
advertising

Arkansas

False advertising

criminal offense

$1000 and/or
60 days

California

Real estate

Real Estate
Commission

rescission; $5000
and/or 5 yrs. state
prison or I yr'.
county jail

offering statement and
misleading advertising

Colorado

Consumer protection

intentional deception

Real estate

Att'y General
Real Estate
Commission

extensive

Connecticut

$1000 to $5000;

disclosure

revocation

Delaware

Consumer fraud

Att'y General

extensive

intentional deception

District of Columbia

Fraudulent
advertising

criminal offense

$500 and/or
60 days

prohibit misleading
advertising

Florida

U.L.S.P.A.-i

Land Sales Board

extensive

registration and
public offering
statement

Georgia

Deceptive advertising Real Estate
Commission
(out-of-state land)

injunction

prevent incoming

Hawaii

U.L.S.P.A.1

Dir. of Regulatory
Agencies

'extensive

registration and
public offering
statement

Idaho

False advertising

criminal offense

$25 to $300

prohibit misleading
advertising

Illinois

Land Sales Act

Dept. of
Registration and
Education

extensive

registration and public
offering statement

False advertising

criminal offense

$100 to $1000

prohibit misleading
advertising

Deceptive advertising
(out-of-state land)

criminal offense

injunction or
$100 to $1000

prevent incoming

consumer fraud

Att'y General

extensive

intentional deception
and misleading
advertising

Kansas

U.L.S.P.A.a

Securities Comm'r

extensive

registration and public

Kentucky

False advertising

criminal offense

$500 and/or
60 days

prohibit misleading

Louisiana

False advertising

criminal offense

$25 to $500 and/or
10 days to 6 months

prohibit misleading
advertising

Maine

None

Maryland

Consumer protection

Att'y General

extensive

intentional deception

Massachusetts

Consumer protection

Att'y General

extensive

intentional deception

Michigan

Unlawful advertising Att'y General

injunction; $1000

intentional deception

injunction; gross
misdemeanor

public report and
prevent deception

$500

prohibit misleading
advertising

Minnesota

Subdivision Control

Comm'r of
Securities

Mississippi

False advertising

criminal offense

deception

deception

offering statement

advertising
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State

Type

Administered,

-Penalty

Missouri

Unlawful advertising

Att'y General

injunction;
restoration;

Focus
intentional deception
5000

Montana

Subdivision Control

Real Estate
Commission

extensive

registration and
public offering
statement

Nevada

False advertising

criminal offense

injunction; gross
misdemeanor

intentional deception

Investigation

Real Estate
Division

injunction;
restitution

deception in
subdivision sales

Nebraska'

None

New Hampshire

Land Sales Full
Disclosure

I

I
Division of Consumer extensive

full- disclosure

Protection

New Jersey

Faudulent advertising Att'y General

New Mexico

Subdivision Control

intentional deception

Att'y General

injunction

$100,000

deception in sale
and advertising

New York

Subdivision Control

Department of State

extensive

prevent deception

North Carolina

False advertising

criminal offense

$50 or 30 days

intentional deception

North Dakota

False advertising

criminal offense

$100 and/or 30 days, deception in sales
injunction
and misleading
advertising

Ohio '

Fraudulent
advertising
Fraudulent
advertising,

criminal offense

$200 to $1000
and/or 20 days

intentional deception

criminal offense

$50 and/or 20 days

prevent misleading
advertising

Oklahoma
Oregon

None

Pennsylvania

Consumer Protection

Att'y General

injunction; $5000

intentional deception

Rhode Island

Consumer Protection

Att'y General

injunction;

intentional deception

South Carolina

U.L.S.P.A.i

Real Estate Comm'r

extensive

registration and
public offering
statement

South Dakota

Falie advertising

criminal offense

$200 to $500
and/or 30 days

prevent misleading
advertising

Tennessee

Securities Law
(out-of-state land)

Comm'r of Insurance
Banking

Fraudulent
advertising

criminal offense

$ 5 to $100
and/or 60 days

intentional deception

Consuner Protection

Att'y General and
Consumer Credit
Comm'r

injunction; $10,000

prevent misleading
advertising and
deceptive conduct

Texas

10,000

Securities Regulation

Deceptive advertising

criminal offense

$10 to $20o

intentional deception

Utah

False advertising

criminal offense

misdemeanor

prohibit misleading,
advertising ,

Vermont

Consumer fraud,

Att'y General

injunction; $10,000;
and $1,000 and
damages in civil suit

intentional deception

Virginia

False advertising

criminal offense

misdemeanor.

prevent misleading
advertising

Washington

Consumer Protection

Att'y General

injunction;
restoration;
treble damages

prevent deception

West Virginia

sale (out-of-state
land)

Comm'r of
Securities

$2000 and/or
6 months

Prevent misleading
advertising and
deception in sales

Wyoming

False advertising

criminal offense

I Uniform Land Sales Practices Act

.

- $100

prohibit misleading
advertising

